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SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN ALASKA 
Grady R. Campion* 
ABSTRACT 
In modern civil litigation, disputes rarely proceed to trial. Summary 
judgment has evolved in state and federal courts across the country as a 
common mechanism for dispute resolution without trial. Alaska courts have 
largely refused to follow this trend. Instead, obtaining summary judgment in 
Alaska represents a nearly impossible challenge. Alaska’s heightened 
summary judgment standard reflects a past era—one  in which advocacy 
occurred in a courtroom before a jury and not in chambers on paper. This 
Note analyzes the evolution of summary judgment in federal courts and in 
Alaska and discusses three procedural mechanisms affecting summary 
judgment in Alaska. After assessing arguments for and against modernizing 
Alaska’s summary judgment standard, this Note concludes with a 
recommendation: Alaska should adopt the reasonable jury summary 
judgment standard. 
INTRODUCTION 
Despite their textual similarities, winning a motion for summary 
judgment in Alaska state court is considerably more difficult than in 
federal court. In 1986, the United States Supreme Court decided three 
cases that modernized the federal summary judgment standard by 
incorporating the parties’ evidentiary burdens at trial to determine 
whether a genuine issue of material fact exists.1 By doing so, the 
Supreme Court recast summary judgment analysis to include not only 
whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, but also whether only the 
trier of fact may resolve the issue.2 The moving party would be entitled 
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 1.  These cases have come to be known as the Celotex trilogy. They are 
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 
317 (1986); and Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 
(1986). 
 2.  Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251–52. 
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to summary judgment as a matter of law only if the trier of fact could 
come to one conclusion in light of the contested factual issues.3 
The text of the federal and Alaska summary judgment rules are 
nearly identical. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, courts “shall 
grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine 
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law.”4 Similarly, Alaska’s summary judgment rule states that 
“[j]udgment shall be rendered forthwith” upon a showing “that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.”5 However, the Alaska supreme court has 
repeatedly declined to adopt the modern federal standard for 
determining genuine issues of material fact for summary judgment 
purposes.6 The Alaska summary judgment standard does not consider 
evidentiary burdens and does not ask how the trier of fact would 
determine any disputed issue.7 This interpretive distinction carries 
important implications for the Alaska court system, its litigants, and the 
efficient administration of justice. 
Much like the pre-1986 federal summary judgment standard,8 
Alaska courts tend to disfavor treating summary judgment motions as a 
procedural shortcut. This exceedingly low barrier to entry undermines 
the utility of summary judgment as an effective procedural tool for civil 
practitioners and a screening device for courts. As one Alaska trial judge 
jokingly explained: “Under our state’s summary judgment rule, if there 
is so much as a shadow of a whisper of a hint of a contested issue of fact, 
then we must deny summary judgment.”9 
Parts I and II of this Note analyze the distinctions between the 
federal and Alaskan summary judgment standards, respectively. Part III 
discusses three procedural aspects of Alaska law that relate to the state 
summary judgment standard: notice pleading, directed verdict, and 
Alaska’s “English Rule” fee shifting. In Part IV, this Note weighs 
 
 3.  Id. at 252. 
 4.  FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). 
 5.  ALASKA R. CIV. P. 56(c). 
 6.  E.g., Christensen v. Alaska Sales & Serv., Inc., 335 P.3d 514, 519–20 
(Alaska 2014); DeNardo v. Bax, 147 P.3d 672, 683–84 (Alaska 2006); Moffatt v. 
Brown, 751 P.2d 939, 942–44 (Alaska 1988). 
 7.  Christensen, 335 P.3d at 519–20. 
 8.  See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327 (unfavorably commenting on prior federal 
decisions that cast summary judgment in a disfavored light and instead 
adopting the view that summary judgment is more properly viewed as “an 
integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole”). 
 9.  An Alaska Superior Court judge made this statement in conversation 
with the author. The statement should not be interpreted as a correct statement 
of the law, nor was it intended as such. 
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arguments for and against changing the Alaska summary judgment 
standard and concludes with the recommendation that Alaska should 
adopt the federal reasonable jury standard for summary judgment. 
I. THE FEDERAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD 
In a series of cases now known as the Celotex trilogy, the U.S. 
Supreme Court significantly changed what constitutes a genuine dispute 
of material fact for the purposes of summary judgment. This change 
modernized the summary judgment standard to mirror its procedural 
relative—directed verdict—by considering the evidentiary burdens that 
the movant and nonmovant will bear at trial.10 
To understand the policies underlying the federal summary 
judgment doctrine, it is helpful to first review the historic development 
of summary judgment as a procedural tool. The origins of summary 
judgment can be traced back to the 1855 Summary Procedure on Bills of 
Exchange Act in England, which granted courts power to issue 
summary decisions in collections actions brought by plaintiffs on bills of 
exchange and promissory notes.11 The bill’s goal was “expedition and 
economy in obtaining a judgment where the circumstances of the case 
lent themselves to a shortened procedure.”12 In 1938, the Supreme Court 
adopted Rule 56, along with the rest of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act of 1934.13 However, as 
summary judgment continued to emerge as a procedural tool, federal 
courts were generally reluctant to use summary judgment out of a 
concern that the nonmoving party would face judgment without an 
opportunity to present his case in court.14 This concern rings true in 
many states today, including Alaska.15 
 
 10.  Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251–52. 
 11.  Charles E. Clark & Charles U. Samenow, The Summary Judgment, 38 YALE 
L. J. 423, 424 (1929). 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Rules Enabling Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 415, 651 Stat. 1064 (1934). See also 
Jack B. Weinstein, After Fifty Years of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Are the 
Barriers to Justice Being Raised?, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1901, 1901 (1989) (discussing 
the history of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). 
 14.  Clark & Samenow, supra note 11, at 470. 
 15.  In 1975, the Second Circuit characterized summary judgment as “a 
drastic device since its prophylactic function, when exercised, cuts off a party’s 
right to present his case to the jury.” Heyman v. Commerce & Indus. Ins. Co., 
524 F.2d 1317, 1320 (2d Cir. 1975). While the Celotex trilogy of cases incorporated 
a new summary judgment standard in federal courts, at least eleven states, 
including Alaska, have remained reluctant to loosen summary judgment. 
Thomas Logue & Javier A. Soto, Florida Should Adopt the Celotex Standard for 
Summary Judgment, 76 FLA. B.J. 20, 20 (2002). 
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As a result, pre-1986 summary judgment rulings required that the 
movant present evidence negating the nonmovant’s case in order to 
obtain summary judgment.16 In Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.,17 the U.S. 
Supreme Court overturned the lower court’s grant of  summary 
judgment to the defendant because the moving defendant  had failed to 
“foreclose the possibility” that the jury could infer facts sufficient for the 
nonmovant to prove its case.18 Under Adickes, the movant’s Rule 56 
burden required disproving the nonmovant’s case by producing 
affirmative evidence of the nonexistence of any material factual issue.19 
In a case where the movant bears no burden of proof at trial, as in 
Adickes, the pre-1986 summary judgment standard imposed an 
artificially high barrier on the movant.20 
Sixteen years later in 1986, the Supreme Court recast the standard 
set forth in Adickes. In Celotex Corp v. Catrett,21 the Supreme Court 
addressed the standard for summary judgment in the context of an 
asbestos case.22 Plaintiff’s claim, that the defendant’s products contained 
asbestos and exposure to that asbestos caused the death of her husband, 
would have been virtually immune to defendant’s summary judgment 
under Adickes analysis.23 The defendant-movant would have been 
required to foreclose the possibility of a verdict for the plaintiff at trial—
that is, the defendant would have needed to prove the decedent’s 
nonexposure to defendant’s asbestos-containing products at any point in 
the decedent’s life.24 
Without expressly overruling Adickes, the Supreme Court held that 
Rule 56(c) requires the entry of summary judgment against a nonmovant 
“who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of any 
element essential to [the nonmovant’s] case, and on which [the 
nonmovant] will bear the burden of proof at trial.”25 In this 
circumstance, a “complete failure of proof concerning an essential 
element” of the nonmovant’s case necessarily means that no genuine 
 
 16.  John E. Kennedy, Federal Summary Judgment: Reconciling Celotex v. 
Catrett with Adickes v. Kress and the Evidentiary Problem under Rule 56, 6 REV. 
LITIG. 227, 236 (1987). 
 17.  398 U.S. 144 (1970). 
 18.  Id. at 157. 
 19.  Kennedy, supra note 16, at 229. 
 20.  Martin H. Redish, Summary Judgment and the Vanishing Trial: Implications 
of the Litigation Matrix, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1329, 1334 (2005). 
 21.  477 U.S. 317 (1986). 
 22.  Id. at 319. 
 23.  Samuel Issacharoff & George Loewenstein, Second Thoughts About 
Summary Judgment, 100 YALE L. J. 73, 80 (1990). 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. 
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issue of material fact exists, rendering any other disputed facts 
immaterial.26 Thus, the standard for granting summary judgment 
“mirrors the standard for a directed verdict under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 50(a).”27 
The Court’s decision in Celotex, however, raised more questions 
about the federal summary judgment standard than it answered. For 
one, a five-vote majority issued the Celotex opinion, with then-Associate 
Justice Rehnquist writing for four Justices and Justice White 
concurring.28 These opinions included three divergent views on the 
burden of production required of the nonmovant to sufficiently 
demonstrate the existence of disputed facts.29 Justice Rehnquist 
characterized this burden as “informing” the court of the absence of 
disputed facts.30 Justice White required more in his concurrence, 
reasoning that “a conclusory assertion that the [nonmovant] has no 
evidence to prove his case” is not enough to move for summary 
judgment.31 Justice Brennan concluded in dissent that the movant 
without the burden of proof at trial could satisfy his burden of 
production for summary judgment either by presenting evidence 
negating an essential element of the nonmovant’s claim, or by 
affirmatively showing that there is no evidence in the record to support 
a judgment for the nonmovant.32 By shifting the requirements of 
summary judgment to correspond with the party’s trial burdens and 
requiring nonmovants to produce evidence of the full range of disputed 
facts, the Celotex majority made summary judgment a defendant’s 
motion. 
Celotex also did not answer the question of how judges determine 
sufficiency and admissibility of the evidence presented at summary 
judgment in light of the reordered burdens facing the movant and 
nonmovant at summary judgment.33 Considered in light of Celotex, both 
 
 26.  Id. at 323. 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  Justice Rehnquist’s lead opinion was written on behalf of himself and 
Justices Marshall, Powell, and O’Connor. 477 U.S. at 319. Justice White’s 
concurring opinion provided the fifth vote for the majority. Id. at 328. Justice 
Brennan dissented, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun. Id. at 
329. Justice Stevens dissented on other grounds. Id. at 337. 
 29.  Issacharoff & Loewenstein, supra note 23, at 81. 
 30.  Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. 
 31.  Id. at 328. 
 32.  Id. at 331–32. 
 33.  See Adam N. Steinman, The Irrepressible Myth of Celotex: Reconsidering 
Summary Judgment Burdens Twenty Years After the Trilogy, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
81, 104–07 (2006) (discussing questions left unanswered by majority opinion in 
Celotex relating to the movant’s burden, the nonmovant’s burden, admissibility, 
and determining the sufficiency of the evidence presented by a nonmovant to 
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Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.34 and Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. 
v. Zenith Radio Corp.35 enlarged the trial judge’s discretionary authority 
by allowing for evidentiary review at the summary judgment stage. 
In Anderson, the Supreme Court considered the newly announced 
summary judgment standard from Celotex in a defamation claim. Liberty 
Lobby brought a libel action against journalist Jack Anderson and others 
for three articles published in The Investigator magazine, which 
portrayed Liberty Lobby as “neo-Nazi, anti-Semitic, racist, and 
Fascist.”36 Anderson moved for summary judgment arguing that Liberty 
Lobby failed to present sufficient evidence of Anderson’s actual malice.37 
The Court had to determine whether a showing of actual malice by clear 
and convincing evidence, as the Court announced in the landmark 
decision New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,38 applied at the summary 
judgment stage in Liberty Lobby’s case.39 
The Court held that the “inquiry involved in a ruling on a motion 
for summary judgment or for a directed verdict necessarily implicates 
the substantive evidentiary standard of proof that would apply at the 
trial on the merits.”40 Applying the substantive evidentiary burdens at 
trial meant that the judge must decide “whether a fair-minded jury 
could return a verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence presented.”41 The 
Court reasoned that it made “no sense to say that a jury could 
reasonably find for either party without some benchmark as to what 
standards govern its deliberations.”42 Those standards are provided by 
the substantive evidentiary burdens applicable to the claim and 
properly determined by the trial judge at summary judgment.43 
However, the Court insisted that determining credibility, weighing the 
evidence, and drawing legitimate inferences from the evidence are 
functions of the jury alone.44 The judge must view the evidence in the 
 
prevent summary judgment). 
 34.  477 U.S. 242 (1986). 
 35.  475 U.S. 574 (1986). 
 36.  Anderson, 477 U.S. at 245. 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 39.  Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247–48. 
 40.  Id. at 252. 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  Id. at 254–55. 
 43.  Id. at 255. 
 44.  Id. In dissent, Justice Brennan notes the inherent tension in this 
concession. The measurement of the “caliber and quantity” of the evidence can 
only be performed by weighing the evidence, which is solely the province of the 
jury. Justice Brennan laments that the Anderson majority may invite “trial courts 
to assess and weigh evidence much as a juror would.” Id. at 266 (Brennan, J., 
dissenting). 
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light most favorable to the nonmovant.45 Additionally, Anderson 
provides the escape hatch that trial judges may decide not to grant 
summary judgment when there is reason to believe that a better course 
of action would be to proceed to trial.46 
Anderson extends the Court’s directive in Celotex, mandating courts 
to consider the sufficiency of the evidentiary record, to its logical 
consequence: the sufficiency of the evidentiary record is a function of the 
burdens of the parties at trial.47 While the Court carefully instructs that 
trial courts must not weigh the evidence, trial courts must assess 
whether the nonmovant provided enough evidence to support its claim 
at trial.48 Thus, Anderson confirms the similarity between directed 
verdict and modern summary judgment and recognizes that the 
“substantive law, presumptions, and burdens of production and 
persuasion” bear on both directed verdict and summary judgment 
motions.49 
The Court’s holding in Matsushita reveals the extent of the 
deference afforded to trial courts at the summary judgment phase 
following Celotex and Anderson. In Matsushita, American television 
manufacturers, led by Zenith, brought an antitrust suit against 
Matsushita and other Japanese television manufacturers, alleging that 
the Japanese manufacturers had illegally conspired in a predatory 
pricing scheme to set artificially low prices in the United States to drive 
American manufacturers out of the market.50 Matsushita moved for 
summary judgment arguing that Zenith had failed to produce 
admissible evidence the Japanese manufacturers entered into an illegal 
conspiracy.51 The Court held that if the facts render the nonmovant’s 
claim implausible—”if the claim is one that simply makes no economic 
sense”—then the nonmovant must present more persuasive evidence in 
support of its claim.52  
In sum, the Celotex trilogy reformulated the federal summary 
judgment standard in two significant ways, both of which greatly 
increased the utility of summary judgment as procedural device. First, 
the trilogy shifted the summary judgment burden to parallel that of the 
party bearing the burden of proof at trial.53 In other words, the movant 
 
 45.  Id. at 255. 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  Kennedy, supra note 16, at 232. 
 50.  475 U.S. 574, 577–78 (1986). 
 51.  Id. at 578. 
 52.  Id. at 587. 
 53.  William W. Schwarzer, et al., The Analysis and Decision of Summary 
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does not need to disprove the nonmovant’s case to prevail at summary 
judgment.54 In practice, this most often means that the nonmovant 
plaintiff, who bears the burden of proof at trial, must also fend off a 
defendant’s summary judgment motion. Second, the Court reformulated 
summary judgment by granting federal trial judges considerable 
discretion to consider genuine issues and factual support in the record.55 
These two major changes to federal summary judgment strengthened 
the motion as a tool for movants and increased the efficiency of the 
motion as a screening device for courts. 
II. ALASKA’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD 
The text of Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 5656 sets forth a 
summary judgment rule substantially similar to the text of Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 56.57 However, an important textual difference in the 
Alaska rule is that a motion “may be supported by affidavits” stating the 
material facts based on personal knowledge.58 Accordingly, an 
opposition to summary judgment may include opposing affidavits and 
“a concise statement of genuine issues setting forth all material facts as 
to which it is contended there exists a genuine issue necessary to be 
litigated.”59 Aside from allowing parties to show facts by affidavit in 
Alaska,60 the federal and state requirements for summary judgment are 
the same textually: “that there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact” and the movant is “entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”61 
In 1962, Gilbertson v. City of Fairbanks62 provided the Alaska 
supreme court its first opportunity to decide a summary judgment 
motion under the state’s recently enacted Rules of Civil Procedure.63 By 
affirming the trial court’s grant of summary judgment, the court in 
Gilbertson ushered in a long line of cases adhering to the pre-1986 federal 
 
Judgment Motions, 139 F.R.D. 441, 451 (1992). 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  Issacharoff & Loewenstein, supra note 23, at 79. 
 56.  “Judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, 
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” ALASKA R. CIV. P. 56(c). 
 57.  “The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that 
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). 
 58.  ALASKA R. CIV. P. 56(c). 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  Id. 
 61.  FED R. CIV. P. 56(a). 
 62.  368 P.2d 214 (Alaska 1962). 
 63.  Id. at 214. 
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summary judgment standard.64 Gilbertson involved a dispute over 
outstanding utility bills Gilbertson owed to the city-owned utility 
following a fire that destroyed Gilbertson’s hotel.65 The City moved for 
summary judgment based on affidavits and cancelled checks showing 
the unpaid balance for utility services provided to the hotel.66 Opposing 
the City’s motion, Gilbertson relied on his deposition testimony in 
which he stated: “I am sure my bills were paid as my cancelled checks 
show . . . so far as I know. I could have lost some checks in the fire.”67 
Gilbertson argued that this testimony raised a genuine issue of material 
fact as to whether the bills were paid.68 
The court rejected Gilbertson’s argument that the possibility he 
“could have lost some checks in the fire” standing alone was sufficient 
to raise a genuine issue of material fact.69 In affirming the trial court’s 
grant of the City’s summary judgment motion, the supreme court 
reasoned that even if Gilbertson had made an unequivocal assertion that 
his account was paid in full, then summary judgment would have been 
improper.70 However, Gilbertson failed to demonstrate a genuine issue 
of material fact because his only supporting evidence was an equivocal 
statement.71 This shows that the Alaska court employed the same pre-
Celotex trilogy summary judgment standard. For example, if Gilbertson 
had testified in his deposition that his record of checks showed some 
payments had not been credited or if the record of checks itself had been 
lost in the fire, then such testimony would have created a genuine issue 
of fact for trial.72 Arguably, these hypothetical examples would not pass 
muster under the Celotex trilogy because even an unequivocal statement 
from Gilbertson, considered in contrast to the City’s physical evidence of 
previously paid checks in the months leading up to the fire, would fail 
to persuade any reasonable jury about the merits of Gilbertson’s 
defense. 
 
 64.  Id. at 216–17. See, e.g., Palzer v. Serv-U-Meat Co., 419 P.2d 201, 205 
(Alaska 1966) (following the pre-1986 federal approach to summary judgment); 
Moffatt v. Brown, 751 P.2d 939, 939–44 (Alaska 1988) (rejecting the modern 
federal summary judgment standard announced in the Celotex trilogy); 
Christensen v. Alaska Sales & Serv., Inc., 335 P.3d 514, 519–20 (Alaska 2014) 
(reaffirming Alaska’s commitment to the pre-1986 federal summary judgment 
standard). 
 65.  Gilbertson, 368 P.2d at 216–17. 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  Id. at 215. 
 68.  Id. 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  Id. at 216. 
 71.  Id. 
 72.  Id. 
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In 1988, two years after the U.S. Supreme Court decided the Celotex 
trilogy, the Alaska supreme court considered whether to incorporate 
substantive evidentiary burdens into Alaska state summary judgment 
practice. Moffatt v. Brown73 involved a defamation claim by a physician 
against a newsletter publisher for allegedly false statements the 
publisher circulated in a newsletter regarding the physician’s abortion 
practice.74 In Moffatt, the Alaska supreme court declined to adopt the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Anderson and instead reaffirmed its 
prior line of cases interpreting Rule 56(c) to require only “a showing that 
a genuine issue of material fact exists to be litigated, and not a showing 
that a party will ultimately prevail at trial.”75 The Moffat court reasoned 
that incorporating substantive evidentiary burdens at summary 
judgment impermissibly required weighing the evidence, encroaching 
upon the role of the jury.76 As a consequence of this holding, the Alaska 
supreme court rendered summary judgment “somewhat harder for a 
libel defendant to win” in Alaska state courts as compared to federal 
court.77  
Most recently, the Alaska supreme court reaffirmed its 
commitment to the pre-1986 federal summary judgment standard in 
Christensen v. Alaska Sales & Service, Inc.78 There, the plaintiffs brought a 
design-defect product liability suit against a car dealership alleging that 
the car’s seat belt system failed to restrain the driver in a collision with 
two moose.79 Following discovery, Alaska Sales & Service moved for 
summary judgment, arguing that plaintiffs failed to present sufficient 
evidence that the seat belt was defective and also that plaintiffs failed to 
set forth admissible evidence that the seat beat’s failure caused 
plaintiff’s injuries.80 The trial court granted Alaska Sales & Service’s 
summary judgment motion and denied plaintiff’s motion for 
reconsideration, determining that “no reasonable jury could find that 
[plaintiffs] have proven that the seat belt . . . was defective.”81 
In reversing the trial court’s grant of summary judgment, the 
Alaska supreme court first noted that the trial court’s conclusion 
misstated Alaska’s summary judgment standard in two ways.82 First, to 
 
 73.  751 P.2d 939 (Alaska 1988). 
 74.  Id. at 940. 
 75.  Id. at 943–44 (citing Gablick v. Wolfe, 469 P.2d 391, 395 (Alaska 1970)). 
 76.  Id. at 944 (citing Dairy Stores, Inc. v. Sentinel Publishing Co., 516 A.2d 
220, 236 (N.J. 1986). 
 77.  Id. 
 78.  335 P.3d 514, 521 (Alaska 2014). 
 79.  Id. at 515. 
 80.  Id. at 516. 
 81.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 82.  Id. 
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fend off summary judgment, the state summary judgment standard 
does not require that the non-movant prove anything.83 Instead, it is 
enough for the non-movant to present some evidence “directly 
contradict[ing] the moving party’s evidence.”84 Second, to the extent that 
the trial court’s use of the term “reasonable jury” indicated that Alaska 
courts consider the evidence in light of a potential jury outcome—i.e. 
incorporating the substantive evidentiary burden at trial, as n federal 
court—the lower court erred.85 The supreme court explained the proper 
summary judgment analysis under the Alaska standard as follows: 
Although we occasionally have described the reasonableness 
standard as whether ‘reasonable jurors could disagree on the 
resolution of a factual issue,’ our perhaps inartful use of the 
term ‘reasonable jurors’ was not meant to suggest use of the 
federal summary judgment standard. We require only that the 
evidence proposed for trial must not be based entirely on 
‘unsupported assumptions and speculation’ and must not be 
‘too incredible to be believed by reasonable minds.’ After the 
court makes reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor 
of the non-moving party, summary judgment is appropriate 
only when no reasonable person could discern a genuine 
factual dispute on a material issue.86 
Thus, the court framed the inquiry as “whether a reasonable person 
could believe the non-moving party’s assertions” and concluded that the 
non-movant’s assertions created a genuine issue of material fact.87 
The distinction between a reasonable jury and reasonable minds 
slices the bologna very thin, but this difference cuts to the middle of 
Alaska’s outdated method of summary judgment analysis. If the federal 
summary judgment standard is appropriately summarized as the 
“reasonable jury” standard, then the Alaska standard may be 
characterized as the “not too incredible to be believed” standard. 
Applying the Alaska summary judgment standard to the facts of 
Christensen, the court found genuine issues of material fact as to both 
defective design and causation.88 In support of the defective design 
dispute, plaintiffs proffered evidence of an unbroken chain of custody 
and deposition testimony that the seat belt mechanism occasionally 
failed to lock upon sudden forward movement and that the plaintiff 
 
 83.  Id. 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  Id. at 519–20. 
 86.  Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 87.  Id. at 520. 
 88.  Id. at 515. 
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always wore a seat belt.89 The movant-defendant argued that the lack of 
evidence regarding the actual seat belt, its performance in the crash, or 
any police report presented such a gap in the evidentiary record that no 
genuine issue existed.90 To prevent summary judgment on causation, the 
nonmovant-plaintiffs presented evidence of a lack of memory following 
the accident, medical evidence of a “closed head injury,” and a mark on 
Christensen’s head after the accident.91 The supreme court concluded 
that plaintiff’s evidence was “not too incredible to be believed” and 
therefore supported the inference that the alleged seat belt defect caused 
plaintiff’s injuries, a genuine issue of material fact.92 
Assessing the facts of Christensen, the supreme court may have 
arrived at the right conclusion by allowing plaintiffs to proceed to trial, 
but it did so for the wrong reasons and under an imprecise method of 
analysis. Finding a genuine dispute as to defective design, the court 
relied heavily on plaintiff’s deposition testimony that the seat belt lock 
failed on occasion, both before and after the accident. Without this 
testimony, plaintiff’s remaining evidence—an unbroken chain of 
custody and habitual seat belt use—was silent as to any defectively 
designed seat belt lock, instead relying only on “unsupported 
assumptions and speculation.”93 However, even under the “reasonable 
jury” standard employed in federal courts, plaintiff’s testimony that the 
seat belt lock occasionally failed may have been enough to survive 
summary judgment because credibility determinations are an issue left 
to the trier of fact.94 In cases like Christensen, where summary judgment 
turns on the nonmovant’s testimony, the application of the federal and 
Alaskan summary judgment standards will likely lead to the same 
result. 
Alaska’s “not too incredible to be believed”95 summary judgment 
standard also leaves questions regarding weighing and sufficiency of 
 
 89.  Id. at 521. 
 90.  Id. 
 91.  Id. at 522. 
 92.  Id. 
 93.  See id. at 520 (requiring the nonmovant to present more than 
“unsupported assumptions and speculation” to overcome the movant’s 
summary judgment motion). 
 94.  See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (limiting the 
Supreme Court’s holding by noting that credibility determinations are left to the 
jury). 
 95.  The Alaskan court first employed this language in Wilson v. Pollet: “If, at 
the hearing on a motion for summary judgment, there is contradictory evidence, 
or the movant’s evidence is impeached on material matters, then an issue of 
credibility is raised, providing the contradictory or impeaching evidence is not 
too incredible to be believed by reasonable minds.” 416 P.2d 381, 384 (Alaska 
1966). 
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the evidence unanswered. While the federal summary judgment 
standard may be open to objections of judges weighing the evidence,96 
the Alaska standard arguably does the same. The only way for an 
Alaska judge to determine whether the nonmovant’s evidence is not too 
incredible to be believed is to weigh the nonmovant’s evidence against 
the evidence proffered by the movant. Case law does not make clear 
precisely how much evidence is sufficient make the dispute genuine, but 
the nonmovant must at least present “more than a scintilla of contrary 
evidence.”97 
Other cases expose the over-breadth of the Alaskan “not too 
incredible to be believed” summary judgment standard. For example, in 
1999, the supreme court reversed a trial court’s grant of summary 
judgment in an improbable—but somehow not incredible98—set of facts. 
In Meyer v. State, Department of Revenue, Child Support Enforcement 
Division ex rel. N.G.T.,99 the Child Support Enforcement Division (CSED) 
sought to establish Meyer’s paternity of N.G.T., the child in question.100 
Following discovery, CSED moved for summary judgment against 
Meyer, relying on a genetic test that established “the probability of 
Meyer’s parentage at 99.98%.”101 Meyer’s opposition to CSED’s 
summary judgment motion relied on a sworn affidavit in which he 
admitted to sexual intercourse with the mother, but denied intercourse 
during the possible period of conception.102 However, Meyer admitted 
that his memory was hazy and could only offer his “belief” that sexual 
intercourse was prior to the probable dates of conception.103 
The supreme court held that Meyer’s sworn denial of sexual 
 
 96.  Anderson, 477 U.S at 266 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see generally Kennedy, 
supra note 16. 
 97.  E.g., Cikan v. ARCO Alaska, Inc., 125 P.3d 335, 339 (Alaska 2005) 
(quoting Martech Const. Co. v. Ogden Envtl. Servs., Inc., 852 P.2d 1146, 1149 n.7 
(Alaska 1993)). 
 98.  Meyer was decided fifteen years before Christensen and does not employ 
the court’s “not too incredible to be believed” language. However, Christensen 
reaffirms Alaska’s summary judgment standard without modification. 335 P.3d 
at 516–17. Thus, Meyer is properly analyzed under the same “not too incredible 
to be believed” language. 
 99.  994 P.2d 365 (Alaska 1999). 
 100.  Id. at 366. 
 101.  Id. According to the genetic test, the odds favoring Meyer’s paternity 
were 6,243 to 1. Id. 
 102.  Id. “Meyer admitted having a sexual relationship with the mother and 
could not remember the precise details of this relationship.” Id. at 371. The 
possible period of conception was between March 15, 1992 and April 15, 1992, 
but the court does not discuss the method by which the possible period of 
conception was determined. See id. at 366. The baby, N.G.T., was born on 
December 26, 1992. Id. 
 103.  Id. at 369 (Fabe, J., dissenting). 
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intercourse during the possible period of conception sufficiently created 
a genuine issue of material fact and therefore precluded summary 
judgment.104 While noting that Meyer must submit more than a scintilla 
of contrary evidence to demonstrate a genuine issue of fact, the court 
opaquely explained that Meyer’s sworn denial was more than a scintilla 
of evidence.105 At least implicitly, the supreme court recognized the 
improbable, even incredible, nature of its holding.106 For instance, the 
court recognized the possibility that Meyer was not the father, but failed 
to consider or analyze the possibility that the thirty-day period of 
conception may have been too narrow.107 Additionally, although the 
court professed not to “weigh the evidence . . . on summary 
judgment[,]”108 it did weigh evidence in determining that Meyer’s 
affidavit was not simply unsupported speculation or too incredible to be 
believed, and that it constituted more than a scintilla of evidence. 
The court’s conclusion in Meyer raises issues about what 
“reasonable minds”109 actually means. The term “reasonable minds” is 
just as much a legal fiction as “reasonable jury.” The reasonable minds 
classification accomplishes little in deciding summary judgment. Rather, 
it is a categorical box that judges use to conduct legal analysis based on 
facts, as they fairly understand them.110 Of course, “reasonable minds” is 
a much larger categorical box than “reasonable jury” because it does not 
include the applicable substantive legal standard. Alaska should adopt 
the smaller box in summary judgment analysis. Meyer raises questions 
about the meaning of “reasonable minds” under Alaska’s “not too 
incredible to be believed” summary judgment standard111 when 
conflicting evidence flies in the face of common sense.  
The court’s decision in Kalenka v. Jadon, Inc.112 presents a different 
problem: whether summary judgment may be denied under the “not too 
incredible to be believed” standard when common sense supports denial 
of the motion, but the evidence does not. The facts of Kalenka are tragic. 
After spending several hours drinking at Chilkoot Charlie’s, an 
Anchorage bar, Morrell left the bar and drove to a fast-food drive 
 
 104.  Id. at 368. 
 105.  Id. 
 106.  See id. (“We remain cognizant of the significant statistical odds 
suggesting Meyer’s paternity.”). 
 107.  See id. at 366. 
 108.  Id. at 367. 
 109.  Christensen v. Alaska Sales & Serv., Inc., 335 P.3d 514, 520 (Alaska 2014). 
 110.  See, e.g., Meyer, 994 P.2d at 368 (stating that the court resolves factual 
disputes at summary judgment in favor of the nonmovant). 
 111.  Christensen, 335 P.3d at 521. 
 112.  305 P.3d 346 (Alaska 2013). 
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through where Morrell bumped the rear of Kalenka’s car.113 The two 
men got into an altercation and Morrell fatally stabbed Kalenka.114 
In filing suit against Chilkoot Charlie to recover a civil judgment, 
the Kalenka Estate must present evidence that the bar served Morrell 
alcohol while he was visibly intoxicated.115 Alaska law immunizes dram 
shops from civil liability for damages caused by an intoxicated patron 
unless the dram shop provided alcohol to the patron when the 
individual was already a “drunken person.”116 The statutory definition 
of drunken person has two elements: (1) substantial impairment of the 
person’s physical or mental conduct resulting from the consumption of 
alcohol; and (2) that such impairment be plain and easily observed or 
discovered by outward manifestations.117 
The Kalenka Estate presented no direct evidence of Morrell’s 
appearance or conduct at the bar.118 The Kalenka Estate presented an 
expert report in opposition to Chilkoot Charlie’s motion for summary 
judgment which concluded that employees at Chilkoot should have 
monitored Morrell’s drunkenness, but did not state whether any 
employee actually observed Morrell exhibit manifestations of 
drunkenness, as required by the statute.119 The trial court granted the 
bar’s summary judgment motion because the Kalenka Estate’s evidence 
involved “‘such a degree of speculation’ that no jury could properly 
infer Morrell was observably drunk at the bar.”120 By a three to two 
margin, the supreme court reversed the trial court’s grant of summary 
judgment after finding six pieces of evidence that the Kalenka Estate 
presented, coupled with all reasonable inferences drawn in favor of the 
nonmovant, which raised a genuine issue of material fact preventing 
summary judgment for the bar.121 These six facts were: (1) Morrell was 
at Chilkoot Charlie’s for two to four hours; (2) he consumed no alcohol 
before arriving at the bar; (3) Morrell was served and consumed 18-19 
 
 113.  Id. at 347. 
 114.  Id. 
 115.  Id. at 350. 
 116.  Id. at 349. 
 117.  ALASKA STAT. 04.21.080(b)(8); Kalenka, 305 P.3d at 349–50. 
 118.  Kalenka, 305 P.3d at 349. Surprisingly, Morrell was available to testify 
and the trial court granted a continuance to give the Kalenka Estate an 
opportunity to depose Morrell, but the Kalenka Estate decided not to depose 
Morrell. Id. at 354 n.15 (Maassen, J., dissenting). 
 119.  Id. at 348. 
 120.  Id. at 349. Interestingly, the language describing what “no jury could 
properly infer” is that of the supreme court. Alaska’s summary judgment 
standard does not ask what a jury could properly infer, but rather, what 
evidence is not “too incredible to be believed by reasonable minds.” Christensen 
v. Alaska Sales & Serv., Inc., 335 P.3d 514, 520. 
 121.  Kalenka, 305 P.3d at 351. 
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alcoholic drinks while at the bar; (4) he consumed no alcohol after 
leaving the bar; (5) approximately forty-five minutes after leaving the 
bar, Morrell displayed “visible and obvious signs of intoxication;” and 
(6) Morrell’s blood-alcohol level was estimated as high as 0.27.122 
However, as the Kalenka dissent points out, these six facts only 
support that Morrell was highly intoxicated at the bar and that he 
manifested his drunkenness forty-five minutes later during a fight.123 
Thus, the assertions that Morrell outwardly manifested his drunkenness 
at the bar and the bar’s employees failed to observe these manifestations 
were not inferences but merely speculation.124 The dissent argued that 
the Kalenka Estate’s claim rested entirely upon “unsupported 
assumptions and speculation.”125 
In contrast to Meyer, Kalenka is a case in which common sense and 
experience support the sentiment that the Kalenka Estate should be 
allowed to proceed to trial, while the evidence presented does not.  
Arguably, anybody who has seen a highly intoxicated person at a bar 
has a vivid mental image of how Morrell appeared the night at Chilkoot 
Charlie’s as he ordered his tenth, fifteenth, and eighteenth drink.126 
However, there was no evidence presented to establish Morrell’s 
behavior inside the bar. As the dissent notes, the “threshold for 
defeating summary judgment is indeed low, . . . but it is still a threshold 
that can be crossed only with evidence.”127 
The majority’s decision to allow the Kalenka Estate to proceed to 
trial creates two possible outcomes. Either Kalenka Estate’s claim would 
lose at directed verdict or the case would proceed to trial, where a jury 
would almost inevitably find for defendant after being instructed on the 
statutorily defined requirements for establishing dram shop liability. 
The Kalenka majority set a low bar for surviving a motion for summary 
judgment, one that allows plaintiffs to proceed to trial, but does not 
encourage plaintiffs to gather the necessary evidence first. Here, perhaps 
a more demanding summary judgment standard would have 
encouraged the Kalenka Estate to depose Morrell and gather the 
evidence needed to win at trial. 
 
 122.  Id. 
 123.  Id. at 353 (Maassen, J., dissenting). 
 124.  Id. This point is reinforced by the only eyewitness testimony of Morrell’s 
typical appearance at the bar; on previous occasions Morrell had been “polite, 
soft spoken and mellow.” Id. at 349. 
 125.  Id. at 352 (Maassen, J., dissenting; see Christensen, 335 P.3d at 520 
(requiring the nonmovant demonstrate more than “unsupported assumptions 
and speculation” to survive summary judgment). 
 126.  Kalenka, 305 P.3d at 348. 
 127.  Id. at 352 (Maassen, J., dissenting). 
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III. THREE PROCEDURAL MECHANISMS AFFECTING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT IN ALASKA 
In addition to the problems inherent in Alaska’s “not too incredible 
to be believed” summary judgment standard, three unique aspects of 
civil procedure in Alaska further urge courts to adopt a more 
demanding standard. First, Alaska has not addressed the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s heightened pleading standards set forth in Twombly128 and 
Iqbal,129 and remains a notice pleading state.130 Second, Alaska’s directed 
verdict standard is not entirely clear.131 The court’s most recent 
statement of the directed verdict standard grants trial courts more 
discretion after trial than at the pre-trial summary judgment stage.132 
Third, unlike federal courts, Alaska employs the “English Rule” for fee 
shifting following the entry of judgment.133 Taken together, notice 
pleading, the vagueness Alaska’s directed verdict, and Alaska’s fee 
shifting rules would support changing the state’s summary judgment 
bar to mirror the modern federal “reasonable jury standard.” 
A. Notice Pleading 
Both Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 and Alaska Rule of Civil 
Procedure 8 require a “short and plain statement of the claim showing 
the pleader is entitled to relief.”134 Notice pleading, as the U.S. Supreme 
Court described it in Conley v. Gibson,135 only requires plaintiff to give 
“fair notice” of the claim and the grounds upon which the claim rests to 
 
 128.  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 129.  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
 130.  ALASKA R. CIV. P. 8. See also Valdez Fisheries Dev. Ass’n v. Alyeska 
Pipeline Serv. Co., 45 P.3d 657, 674 (Alaska 2002) (Bryner, J., dissenting) 
(dissenting from the majority’s grant of a motion to dismiss on grounds that 
Alaska’s notice pleading standard requires the complaint only set forth some 
viable cause of action). 
 131.  See Christensen v. Alaska Sales & Serv., Inc., 335 P.3d 514, 520 n.49 
(Alaska 2014) (disavowing prior comparisons of directed verdict to summary 
judgment and stating that Alaska’s “summary judgment standard is not the 
same as the standard for deciding post-trial motions for directed verdict”). 
Compare Cameron v. Chang-Craft, 251 P.3d 1008, 1017–18 (Alaska 2011) (using a 
summary judgment standard for a directed verdict) with Murray E. Gildersleeve 
Logging Co. v. N. Timber Corp., 670 P.2d 372, 377 (Alaska 1983) (using a 
different definition of the standard for a direct verdict). 
 132.  Christensen, 335 P.3d 514, 520 n.49. 
 133.  State v. Native Vill. of Nunapitchuk, 156 P.3d 389, 398 (Alaska 2007). 
 134.  FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2); ALASKA R. CIV. P. 8(a). 
 135.  355 U.S. 41 (1957), abrogated by Bell Atl. Co. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554 
(2007). 
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survive dismissal of the complaint.136 However, the U.S. Supreme Court 
arguably raised its pleading standard interpretation in Twombly137 and 
Iqbal138 to require the showing of a plausible claim for relief. Alaska has 
neither addressed nor adopted this change.139 
The Alaska supreme court has not addressed whether the facial 
plausibility standard federal courts in Twombly and Iqbal adopted also 
applies in Alaska.140 However, there is little reason to think that Alaska 
will adopt the facial plausibility standard for Rule 12(b)(6) analysis any 
time soon. Alaska courts disfavor motions to dismiss and grant 
dismissal only when it “appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can 
prove no set of facts that would entitle him or her to relief.”141 Even if 
the relief demanded in the complaint is unobtainable, Alaska courts 
refuse to dismiss the complaint “as long as some relief might be 
available on the basis of the alleged facts.”142 Thus, Alaska courts 
construe complaints liberally and grant the complaining party the 
benefit of the doubt.143 
By contrast, federal courts require facial plausibility of a complaint 
to survive a motion to dismiss analysis.144 This plausibility standard 
requires that the plaintiff’s complaint show more than a possibility of 
 
 136.  Id. at 47. 
 137.  550 U.S. 554. In the antitrust context, Twombly required that the plaintiff 
must allege facts in the complaint with sufficient specificity to allow a court to 
determine that the claim was plausible. Id. at 556. 
 138. 556 U.S. 662 (2009). This case applied Twombly’s heightened pleading 
standard to all federal civil litigation. Id. at 684. After Iqbal, a federal complaint 
must state a plausible claim for relief, assuming all well-plead factual allegations 
as true, to survive a motion to dismiss. Id. at 678–79. 
 139.  E.g., L.D.G., Inc. v. Robinson, 290 P.3d 215, 218 (Alaska 2012) (using the 
“no set of facts” language from Conley); Philip A. Tarpley, The Doctrine In The 
Shadows: Reverse-Erie, Its Cases, Its Theories, And Its Future With Plausibility 
Pleading In Alaska, 32 ALASKA L. REV. 213, 215 (2015) (“Though a replica state, the 
Alaska court system has yet to address Twombly and Iqbal.”). 
 140.  Twombly has been cited by the United States District Court for the 
District of Alaska twenty-seven times, but it has never been cited by the Alaska 
supreme court. Similarly, Iqbal has been cited by the United States District Court 
for the District of Alaska twenty-six times, but it has never been cited by the 
Alaska supreme court. 
 141.  Adkins v. Stansel, 204 P.3d 1031, 1033 (Alaska 2009). This echoes the pre-
Twombly-Iqbal federal standard: “[A] complaint should not be dismissed for 
failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can 
prove no set of facts in support of his claim . . . .” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 
45–46 (1957), abrogated by Twombly, 550 U.S. 554. 
 142.  Adkins, 204 P.3d at 1033. 
 143.  See Knight v. Am. Guard & Alert, Inc., 714 P.2d 788, 791 (Alaska 1986) 
(“The motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is viewed with disfavor and is 
rarely granted.”) (internal citation omitted). 
 144.  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 
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entitlement to relief, but less than a level of probability.145 Complaints 
that fail to allege sufficient factual particularity to carry claims “across 
the line from conceivable to plausible” are dismissed under the facial 
plausibility standard.146 Deciding a motion to dismiss under the 
standard of facial plausibility is a context-specific inquiry that requires 
federal courts to rely on judicial experience and common sense.147 Thus, 
a complaint requires far more factual specificity to survive a motion to 
dismiss in federal court than in Alaska state court. 
Considered together, motion to dismiss and motions for summary 
judgment in federal court shifts the gatekeeping function of the trial 
judge from the trial phase forward to both the pleading and discovery 
phases.148 The modernization of the pleading standard and summary 
judgment standard in federal court affords trial judges significant 
pretrial discretion.149 The experience and common sense of the federal 
judiciary justifies this discretion.150 A heightened summary judgment 
standard differs from a heightened pleading standard in that the facts 
matter, and this Note advocates for a higher summary judgment 
standard but not a heightened pleading standard. At the summary 
judgment stage of a proceeding, the trial judge has the benefit of a full 
evidentiary record.151 While a heightened pleading standard dismisses a 
plaintiff before unlocking the door to discovery, a heightened summary 
judgment standard only dismisses a plaintiff when no stone has been 
left unturned. 
B. Directed Verdict 
Recently, the supreme court has stated that Alaska’s summary 
judgment standard does not mirror the state’s standard for deciding 
post-trial motions for directed verdict.152 In a footnote, the supreme 
court in Christensen favorably quoted a thirty-one year old recitation of 
 
 145.  Id. 
 146.  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007). 
 147.  Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. 
 148.  Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L. J. 1, 50–51 (2010). 
 149.  Id. at 51. 
 150.  See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (noting that determining plausibility will “be a 
context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 
experience and common sense”). 
 151.  If sufficient evidence is not available to the nonmovant, “the court may 
refuse the application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit 
affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or 
may make such other order as is just.” ALASKA R. CIV. P. 56(f). 
 152.  ALASKA R. CIV. P. 50(a); Christensen v. Alaska Sales & Serv., Inc., 335 
P.3d 514, 520 n.49 (Alaska 2014). 
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Alaska’s directed verdict standard: “[A] directed verdict will be granted 
when reasonable jurors could not differ in their resolution of a disputed 
issue of fact.”153 Thus, unlike Alaska’s summary judgment standard, 
directed verdict analysis incorporates the movant’s evidentiary burden 
in determining whether a factual issue is genuinely disputed.154 
However, the supreme court has repeatedly muddled whether 
directed verdict motions are analyzed under the “reasonable jury” 
standard (incorporating the evidentiary burden)155 or the “reasonable 
person” standard (not incorporating the evidentiary burden).156 
Confusingly, the supreme court has cited the same case at different times 
for these conflicting propositions.157 
By contrast, the federal standard for directed verdict under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a) is set forth in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 
Inc.158 In federal court, the standard for directed verdict mirrors the 
standard for summary judgment.159 A trial judge must direct a verdict 
“if, under the governing law, there can be but one reasonable conclusion 
as to the verdict.”160 At the federal level, the difference between 
summary judgment and directed verdict is procedural: summary 
judgment is decided on documentary evidence before trial while 
directed verdict is made at trial based on the admitted evidence, 
whether documentary, physical, or oral testimony.161 
If we take the Alaska supreme court at its (most recent) word, 
Alaska’s directed verdict standard is essentially the same as the federal 
 
 153.  Christensen, 335 P.3d at 520, n.49 (quoting Murray E. Gildersleeve 
Logging Co. v. N.  Timber Corp., 670 P.2d 372, 377 (Alaska 1983)). 
 154.  Id. 
 155.  E.g., id. 
 156.  E.g., Great W. Sav. Bank v. George W. Easley Co., J.V., 778 P.2d 569, 578 
(Alaska 1989) (stating that the court’s role “is to determine whether the evidence, 
when viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, is such that 
reasonable persons could not differ in their judgment as to the facts”; see also 
Cameron v. Chang-Craft, 251 P.3d 1008, 1017–18 (Alaska 2011) (stating that for 
directed verdict purposes “the only evidence that should be considered is the 
evidence favorable to the non-moving party” and if there exists “any doubt, 
questions of fact should be submitted to the jury”) (emphasis added). 
 157.  Compare Gildersleeve, 670 P.2d at 377 (citing Mullen v. Christiansen, 642 
P.2d 1345, 1348 (Alaska 1982) for the proposition that directed verdict will be 
granted when “reasonable jurors could not differ in their resolution of a 
disputed issue of fact.”), with Great W. Sav. Bank, 778 P.2d at 578 (citing Mullen, 
642 P.2d 1345 (pin cite omitted in original) for the proposition that directed 
verdict will be granted when “reasonable persons could not differ in their 
judgment as to the facts” and further explaining that courts will not weigh 
evidence or determine credibility at directed verdict). 
 158.  477 U.S. 242 (1986). 
 159.  Id. at 250. 
 160.  Id. 
 161.  Id. at 251. 
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standard. The court considers the evidence in light of the parties’ 
evidentiary burdens and may enter a verdict for the movant if no 
genuine issue of fact exists to require jury submission.162 This makes 
perfectly good sense. A directed verdict motion follows the presentation 
of evidence at trial and cross-examination. The only cases affected by 
direct verdict are those that are not worthy of submission to the jury to 
begin with.163 If Alaska trial judges have the discretion to determine 
directed verdict motions under a “reasonable jury” standard, they 
should be afforded the same discretion to apply the same standard at 
the pretrial stage by way of summary judgment. Further, a revised 
summary judgment standard would afford the Alaska supreme court 
another opportunity to clarify its unclear case law on the appropriate 
standard for directed verdict. 
C. “English Rule” Fee Shifting 
Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 82 grants the prevailing party in a 
civil lawsuit partial compensation by allowing a percentage award of a 
recovered money judgment, or a percentage of attorney’s fees in a non-
monetary judgment, paid by the losing party.164 Rule 82 sets out a 
schedule providing the recoverable percentage for attorney’s fees based 
on the judgment amount and whether the case went to trial.165 In the 
other forty-nine states, courts employ the “American Rule” in which the 
prevailing party is typically not entitled to attorney’s fees from the 
losing party.166 Alaska’s “English Rule” aims to compensate a prevailing 
party for the expenses incurred asserting and enforcing its rights.167 
Proponents of Alaska’s fee shifting rule argue that heightened stakes 
both restrain frivolous or weak claims and create higher incentives for 
meritorious parties to assert their rights by compensating the prevailing 
party.168 Opponents of the “English Rule” argue that the rule creates 
unfair windfall, draconian penalties for losing litigants, and generally 
has a chilling effect on both meritorious and frivolous litigation.169 
Though Alaska’s “English Rule” has been analyzed both 
 
 162.  Id.; Christensen v. Alaska Sales & Serv., Inc., 335 P.3d 514, 520 n.49 
(Alaska 2014). 
 163.  FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a)(1). 
 164.  ALASKA R. CIV. P. 82. 
 165.  ALASKA R. CIV. P. 82(b)(1). 
 166.  Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975). 
 167.  State v. Native Vill. of Nunapitchuk, 156 P.3d 389, 398 (Alaska 2007). 
 168.  Susanne Di Pietro & Teresa W. Carns, Alaska’s English Rule: Attorney’s 
Fee Shifting in Civil Cases, 13 ALASKA L. REV. 33, 35 (1996). 
 169.  Id. 
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theoretically and empirically, the tangible effects of the rule remain 
murky.170 However, three points are important in the context of Alaska’s 
summary judgment standard. First, Alaska’s “English Rule” does not 
appear to affect the per capita rate of civil lawsuit filings.171 While there 
are countless jurisdictional, cultural, and economic factors that require 
approaching this conclusion with caution, if correct, this finding 
indicates that the “English Rule” has little effect on frivolous lawsuits.  
Second, Rule 82 is predominantly a one-way street in practice.172 
Victorious plaintiffs bringing suits against corporations and insurance 
companies generally have a much higher prospect at recovering Rule 82 
fees than victorious defendant corporations.173 
Third, and perhaps most important for any summary judgment 
discussion, the effect of Rule 82 on settlement prospects is unclear.174 
Rule 82 has the potential to increase the total cost of litigation for the 
losing party, thereby increasing the stakes of proceeding to trial.  
Rule 82 should, then, encourage settlements among risk-averse, 
rational parties. However, such assumptions may not bear out in 
personally and emotionally charged cases. The actual effect of Rule 82 
may instead be heavily influenced by the nature of the claim and the 
relationship between the parties to the lawsuit. A higher standard for 
summary judgment would serve to further settlement incentives by 
establishing a clear and meaningful litmus test for the viability of claims 
in Alaska during the pre-trial phase of litigation. 
IV. WEIGHING THE MERITS OF CHANGING ALASKA’S SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT STANDARD 
Thus far, this Note has analyzed the distinctions between current 
federal and Alaska summary judgment standards and discussed three 
related procedural devices that may support a modernized Alaska 
 
 170.  See Douglas C. Rennie, Rule 82 & Tort Reform: An Empirical Study of the 
Impact of Alaska’s English Rule on Federal Civil Case Filings, 29 ALASKA L. REV. 1, 7 
(2012) (reviewing theoretical arguments about the “English Rule,” conducting a 
comparative empirical analysis of civil filings in Alaska and similar districts, and 
concluding that civil filings are not significantly deterred in Alaska by the Rule); 
Di Pietro & Carns, supra note 168, at 62 (discussing the study’s empirical 
findings regarding the effects of Alaska’s “English Rule”); Gordon Sommers, The 
End of the Public Interest Exception: Preventing the Deterrence of Future Litigants with 
Rule 82(b)(3)(I), 31 ALASKA L. REV. 131, 134 (2014). 
 171.  Di Pietro & Carns, supra note 168, at 62–63. 
 172.  See id. at 60–61 (discussing the effects of Rule 82 in the context of 
personal injury and insurance defense litigation). 
 173.  See id. (quoting an insurance personal injury defense attorney who said 
that “[w]hen we . . . try to collect our Rule 82 award, we’re seen as ogres”). 
 174.  Rennie, supra note 170, at 16. 
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standard. This note analyzes three major arguments for the adoption of 
a new summary judgment standard: (1) the efficient administration of 
justice; (2) preventing confusion; and (3) promoting consistency. This 
Note then addresses three arguments against changing the summary 
judgment standard: (1) overstatement of the efficiency justification; (2) 
the Seventh Amendment right of trial by jury; and (3) stare decisis. This 
Note concludes with a recommendation: the Alaska supreme court 
should adopt the “reasonable jury” summary judgment standard in 
accordance with the federal Celotex trilogy doctrine because the 
arguments in favor of a modernized standard, coupled with Alaska’s 
distinctive procedural devices, strongly outweigh the arguments to the 
contrary. 
A. Arguments for Adopting the Federal Standard in Alaska 
1. Improving Efficiency  
 
A modernized summary judgment standard would allow for a 
more efficient administration of justice in Alaska state courts. The 
standard this Note advocates is essentially the same as the “reasonable 
jury” standard currently employed by federal courts. The purpose of the 
Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure is to “secure the just, speedy and 
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.”175 A 
modernized summary judgment rule—one that incorporates the 
evidentiary burdens of the parties at trial and affords trial judges 
sufficient discretion to determine motions based on the facts 
presented—would be more faithful to the purpose of the Alaska Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
The reasonable jury standard in Alaska has its strongest effect on 
parties with the least viable claims. Yet, even these parties may fare 
objectively better under the reasonable jury standard. For example, a 
plaintiff with an exceptionally weak claim under Alaska’s current “not 
too incredible to be believed” summary judgment standard will likely 
have the opportunity to go to trial if they refuse to settle.176 Although 
this hypothetical plaintiff can show more than a scintilla of evidence, 
they will likely not be able to win at trial. After their day in court, 
plaintiff may end up paying a portion of defendant’s attorney’s fees.177 
 
 175.  ALASKA R. CIV. P. 1. 
 176.  See supra Part III discussing Alaska’s notice pleading requirements. 
 177.  ALASKA R. CIV. P. 82. In this hypothetical, it is not hard to imagine that a 
trial judge might be more likely to award defendant’s attorney’s fees after being 
forced to deny summary judgment and preside over a largely meritless trial. 
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The meritless plaintiff would have been in a better economic position 
losing at summary judgment. 
For the same economic reasons, defendants and the court would 
prefer this outcome as well. Alaskan defendants stand to benefit 
significantly from a modern summary judgment standard. Summary 
judgment gives defendants at least one meaningful chance resolve weak 
claims favorably, limit litigation expenses, and prevent the danger of 
exposure to a runaway jury. Courts would benefit as well. The mere 
threat of a stronger summary judgment standard would force contested 
issues to the forefront of a dispute in the pre-trial phase and allow courts 
to clear the docket of meritless cases more effectively. Nuisance value 
lawsuits are an economic drag on defendants, plaintiffs, and the court 
system. The reasonable jury standard would help to eliminate some of 
this deadweight loss in Alaska courts. 
The reasonable jury standard in Alaska would also promote the 
efficient administration of justice by encouraging settlement. Alaska’s 
procedural system affords defendants minimal opportunities to dispose 
of claims before trial, especially when compared to the federal system. 
Mindful plaintiffs, even those with relatively weak claims, will 
recognize that defendants have no reasonable expectation of obtaining 
dismissal at the pre-trial stage. Accordingly, plaintiffs have little 
incentive to engage in settlement discussions before trial. Under the 
current system, plaintiffs and defendants occupy diametrically opposed 
positions with respect to settlement. 
An effective summary judgment procedure forces parties to 
evaluate the strength of their claims and defenses.178 In the case of a 
weak claim where the court is more likely to grant summary judgment, 
meaningful summary judgment would incentivize the nonmovant to 
settle before the close of discovery. In the case of a contested claim, the 
parties would have to make a more concerted effort at the summary 
judgment stage by putting forth all available evidence to support their 
claims. This would allow the court to filter out the non-contested issues 
and enable the parties to better understand the opponent’s claims and 
evidence. Even when denied, a motion for summary judgment under 
the reasonable jury standard may have the effect of bringing the parties 
closer to settlement.179 Forcing the parties to confront the realities of the 
 
 178.  See Edward Brunet, Six Summary Judgment Safeguards, 43 AKRON L. REV. 
1165, 1167 (2010) (“This summary judgment burden of production insures that 
only those cases with legitimate disputed issues of fact merit a trial and thereby 
conserves expensive and scarce trial and jury resources.”). 
 179.  See id. at 1167 (arguing that a denial of a summary judgment motion 
enhances the value of settlement for the nonmovant). 
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evidence and “balance the realistic probabilities of success against the 
costs associated with further litigation” is more likely when the threat of 
summary judgment is viewed by both parties as legitimate.180 
Finally, granting trial court judges more discretion at the summary 
judgment stage would allow for great efficiency in the administration of 
justice. Alaska Rule 56 already grants judges a number of discretionary 
powers. Judges may “refuse the application for judgment” or “order a 
continuance” for further discovery or may “make such other order as is 
just.”181 Under the current “not too incredible to be believed” standard, a 
trial judge may deny summary judgment in the rare case where the 
nonmovant presents no evidence at all, but would be unable to grant 
summary judgment in a case where it is evident that the nonmovant 
cannot meet its burden at trial. Increased flexibility in granting summary 
judgments would be consistent with the trial judge’s other discretionary 
powers. 
2. Preventing Confusion 
 
The reasonable jury standard would also prevent considerable 
confusion in Alaska courts. For one, legal practitioners must recognize 
the difference between the state and federal summary judgment 
standards as well as the difference between the state’s summary 
judgment standard and its directed verdict standard. Additionally, the 
Alaska supreme court has been less than clear in rejecting the federal 
summary judgment standard. The supreme court’s recent discussion in 
Christensen admits that the court has often conflated “reasonable 
person” with “reasonable juror” and “reasonable jury.”182 The supreme 
court has also cited to Celotex,183 Anderson,184 and Matsushita185 
 
 180.  Issacharoff & Lowenstein, supra note 23 at 75 n.11. 
 181.  ALASKA R. CIV. P. 56(f). 
 182.  Supra, Part II. 
 183.  The Alaska supreme court has erroneously cited to Celotex twice. 
Greywolf v. Carroll, 151 P.3d 1234, 1241 (Alaska 2007); Cooper v. State, Dep’t of 
Corr., No. S-14497, 2012 WL 4039813, at *2 (Alaska 2012) (quoting Greywolf, 151 
P.3d at 1241). 
 184.  The Alaska supreme court has erroneously cited to Anderson three times. 
Cameron v. Chang-Craft, 251 P.3d 1008, 1017 (Alaska 2011) (quoting  Reeves v. 
Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150, (2000)); Enders v. Parker, 125 
P.3d 1027, 1031–32 (Alaska 2005); State v. Carpenter, 171 P.3d 41, 71 (Alaska 
2007) (Carpeneti, J., concurring). 
 185.  The Alaska supreme court has cited Matsushita six times, though on each 
occasion the case was cited for propositions other than the summary judgment 
holding. Alakayak v. British Columbia Packers, Ltd., 48 P.3d 432, 450 (Alaska 
2002); Meyer v. State, Dep’t of Revenue, Child Support Enforcement Div. ex rel. 
N.G.T., 994 P.2d 365, 369 (Alaska 1999) (Eastbaugh, J., concurring); Alakayak v. 
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repeatedly—further confusing the issue of whether the state actually 
rejects the federal reasonable jury standard. Lastly, the supreme court 
has erroneously conflated the state’s “not too incredible to be believed” 
summary judgment standard with its “reasonable jury” directed verdict 
standard.186 So long as these two standards are in conflict, confusion will 
persist within the Alaska Bar. 
3. Promoting Consistency 
 
Applying the reasonable jury standard at the state level would also 
promote consistency and produce more equitable and just results. 
Though the Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure were originally based on 
the federal rules, the Supreme Court has adopted a modernized 
interpretation of the federal rules, which Alaska courts largely declined 
to follow. The federal modernization favors “increasingly early case 
disposition in the name of efficiency, economy, and avoidance of 
abusive and meritless lawsuits.”187 Any eligible defendant sued in 
Alaska state court would be wise to file a notice of removal to take the 
suit to federal court, where summary judgment is more attainable. 
Accordingly, shrewd plaintiffs may be more likely to attempt to prevent 
diversity of citizenship and thereby remain in state court. Either way, 
the difference between state and federal procedural rules will be 
outcome determinative for a significant number of parties, regardless of 
the merits of the cases. 
The reasonable jury standard may also promote consistency in 
application across Alaska state courts as well. The current “not too 
incredible to be believed” standard operates inconsistently to the extent 
that trial courts and the Alaska supreme court disagree about the facts of 
a case.188 Ultimately, the Alaska standard for summary judgment is 
 
All Alaskan Seafoods, Inc., No. 3AN-95-04676CI, 1999 WL 1027062 at *3–4 
(Alaska Super Ct. July 2, 1999), rev’d sub nom. Alakayak v. British Columbia 
Packers, Ltd., 48 P.3d 432 (Alaska 2002); Buster v. Gale, 866 P.2d 837, 841 (Alaska 
1994); Colt Indus. Operating Corp., Quincy Compressor Div. v. Frank W. 
Murphy Mfr., Inc., 822 P.2d 925, 933 (Alaska 1991), superseded by statute on other 
grounds, Tort Reform Act of 1986, Ch. 139, § 1 SLA 1986, as recognized by Alaska 
Gen. Alarm, Inc. v. Grinnell, 1 P.3d 98, 105 (Alaska 2000); Norris v. Gatts, 738 
P.2d 344, 349 (Alaska 1987). 
 186.  Supra, Part III. 
 187.  Miller, supra note 148, at 10. 
 188.  E.g., Meyer v. State, Dep’t of Revenue, Child Support Enforcement Div. 
ex rel. N.G.T., 994 P.2d 365 (Alaska 1999) (finding that Meyer had raised a 
material fact issue of paternity through his sworn denial of sexual intercourse 
during the relevant time period, while the superior court had granted summary 
judgment based on a paternity test that established that there was a 99.98% 
probability of Meyer’s paternity, thereby creating no issue of material fact). 
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whatever the supreme court says it is—even in the case of the lying 
affiant and a DNA test. The reasonable jury standard would promote 
greater consistency and ease of administration by rendering the 
interpretive distinctions between what reasonable minds would find 
incredible and “not too incredible” irrelevant. Instead, under the 
reasonable jury standard, the dispute must rise to the level of the 
nonmovant’s substantive evidentiary burden. 
B. Arguments Against Adopting the Federal Standard in Alaska 
Many scholars have discussed drawbacks and problems with the 
modern federal summary judgment standard.189 None of these articles 
address the particularities of Alaska law. Instead, the scholarship has 
generally focused on the transformation of summary judgment within 
the broader federal movement favoring early disposal and dismissal of 
claims.190 Because Alaska has largely resisted the federal shift towards 
early claims disposal, much of the summary judgment scholarship is of 
limited utility as applied to Alaska’s procedural framework. 
Nevertheless, there are at least three tenable arguments against 
changing the Alaska summary judgment standard: (1) the efficiency 
justification is overstated; (2) the Seventh Amendment right of trial by 
jury; and (3) stare decisis. 
1. Efficiency 
 
One argument against the modern reasonable jury standard is that 
proponents overstate its efficiency. Opponents argue that the reasonable 
jury standard incentivizes defendants to impose lengthy discovery 
periods and an expensive motion practice upon all parties.191 
Defendants, encouraged by the perceived gains at the summary 
 
 189. E.g., Issacharoff & Loewenstein, supra note 23, at 74–75 (discussing the 
unintended consequences of a liberalized summary judgment standard); Suja A. 
Thomas, Why Summary Judgment is Unconstitutional, 93 VA. L. REV. 139, 139 (2007) 
(asserting that summary judgment unconstitutionally conflicts with the jury’s 
role as the finder of fact); Patricia Wald, Summary Judgment at Sixty, 76 TEX. L. 
REV. 1897, 1898 (1998) (analyzing the transformation and increased use of 
summary judgment in the D.C. Circuit); Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to 
Judgment: Are the “Litigation Explosion,” “Liability Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés 
Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 982 
(2003) (arguing for further guidance to prevent trial courts from encroaching on 
the fundamental rights of litigants); John Bronsteen, Against Summary Judgment, 
75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 522, 522 (2007) (arguing that summary judgment costs the 
court system more than it saves). 
 190.  E.g., Miller, supra note 148, at 10. 
 191.  Bronsteen, supra note 189, at 551 (2007). 
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judgment stage, would rattle off shotgun-style, boilerplate summary 
judgment motions in every case.192 A logjam of summary judgment 
motions would cripple court dockets and outweigh any gains from the 
higher number of dismissals.193 Worst of all, these marginal or negligible 
efficiencies come at the expense of an ever-eroding right to trial by 
jury.194 
There are two potential responses to the opponents’ argument that 
the reasonable jury standard’s efficiency is overstated. First, judges 
could summarily review a motion for summary judgment immediately 
upon filing. In so doing, the judge would quickly determine whether the 
motion was frivolous, whether an opposition was necessary, and 
whether continued discovery was needed.195 This intermediate step 
would allow judges to sift out meritless, boilerplate motions, even 
before the nonmovant’s filing of an opposition. 
Second, Alaska is uniquely situated to address any abuses of a 
modernized summary judgment standard because of the state’s “English 
Rule” for fee shifting.196 To the extent that reasonable jury summary 
judgment would incentivize defendants to employ dilatory tactics, 
expansive discovery, or expensive motion practices in the hopes of 
escaping at summary judgment, such tactics would become a double-
edged sword. On the one hand, the defendant may have a better chance 
at escaping a lawsuit using summary judgment. On the other hand, 
extensively litigated issues would carry higher attorney’s fees under 
Rule 82 for those defendants who lose at trial.197 Prior to 
implementation, the efficiencies and inefficiencies of the reasonable jury 
standard in Alaska are largely speculative. However, there is good 
reason to think that some inefficiencies of the federal reasonable jury 
standard may not translate in Alaska’s fairly unique procedural 
landscape. 
2. Seventh Amendment Right of Trial by Jury 
 
Some commentators have argued that summary judgment is 
unconstitutional.198 Generally, this argument holds that no procedural 
mechanism available in 1791 restricted a plaintiff’s right to jury trial to 
 
 192.  Schwarzer, supra note 53, at 478. 
 193.  Id. 
 194.  Miller, supra note 189, at 1134. 
 195.  Schwarzer, supra note 53, at 479. 
 196.  See ALASKA R. CIV. P. 82 (setting forth the schedule and procedure for 
attorney’s fees awards in Alaska state courts). 
 197.  See id. 
 198.  Thomas, supra note 189, at 139–40; Bronsteen, supra note 189, at 547–50. 
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the same extent as modern summary judgment,199 and that summary 
judgment gave judges this power.200 Thus, because current federal 
summary judgment practice affords judges a power that did not exist at 
common law in 1791, federal summary judgment violates the 
constitutional principle that “[i]n suits at common law, . . . the right of 
trial by jury shall be preserved.”201 
Substantial case law and commentary exists rejecting the view that 
summary judgment is unconstitutional.202 While the Seventh 
Amendment preserves the right to trial by jury, it does not preserve the 
right to trial by jury for meritless or frivolous claims.203 More 
importantly for the purposes of Alaska’s summary judgment standard, 
under current U.S. Supreme Court doctrine, the Seventh Amendment is 
one of the few Bill of Rights protections not incorporated upon the states 
through the Fourteenth Amendment.204 Thus, there is a strong argument 
that the Seventh Amendment’s protection of a right to trial by jury 
applies to the federal government and does not apply to the states.205 
Instead, the constitutional protection argument against summary 
judgment must rely on protection from the Alaska constitution. The 
Alaska constitution provides: “In civil cases . . . the right of trial by a jury 
of twelve is preserved to the same extent as it existed at common 
law.”206 The Alaska supreme court has repeatedly rejected claims that 
summary judgment violates Article I § 16 of the constitution.207 At 
common law in Alaska, courts had authority to remove factual issues 
from consideration by the jury when the court determined “there was 
insufficient evidence to raise a question of fact to be presented to the 
jury.”208 A grant of summary judgment only violates the Alaska 
constitution when improperly granted—that is, when granted if a 
genuine issue of material fact actually exists.209 Accordingly, if the 
 
 199.  Bronsteen, supra note 189, at 550. 
 200.  Id. 
 201.  Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. VII). 
 202.  Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 350–51 (1979); Fidelity 
& Deposit Co. v. United States, 187 U.S. 315, 320 (1902); Brunet, supra note 178, at 
1186. 
 203.  Fidelity, 187 U.S. at 320–21. “The purpose of the rule is to preserve the 
court from frivolous defenses, and to defeat attempts to use formal pleading as 
means to delay the recovery of just demands.” Id. 
 204.  McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 765 n.13 (2010). 
 205.  Id. 
 206.  ALASKA CONST., art. I, § 16. 
 207.  Capolicchio v. Levy, 194 P.3d 373, 380–81 (Alaska 2008); Falke v. Council 
of the City of Fairbanks, 960 P.2d 589, 590 (Alaska 1998); Christensen v. NCH 
Corp., 956 P.2d 468, 477 (Alaska 1998). 
 208.  Christensen, 956 P.2d at 477 (internal quotations and brackets omitted). 
 209.  Id. 
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Alaska supreme court were to adopt a new interpretation of “genuine 
issue” that incorporated the nonmovant’s substantive evidentiary 
burden, the same logic applies to the constitutionality of summary 
judgment. If no genuine issue of fact exists and the movant is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law, then summary judgment is proper and 
does not violate Art. I § 16 of the Alaska constitution. 
The Alaska supreme court’s most recent statement on summary 
judgment indicates the court may be unlikely to adopt a reformed 
summary judgment standard any time soon.210 However, the supreme 
court’s reason for declining to adopt a new standard does not appear to 
be based on constitutional concerns.211 Instead, the court has maintained 
its “lenient standard for withstanding summary judgment” to preserve 
the right of litigants to have factual questions determined by the jury.212 
3. Stare Decisis 
 
Finally, the doctrine of stare decisis stands in the way of a reformed 
summary judgment standard in Alaska. Stare decisis is the principle to 
let that which has been decided stand. The judiciary’s duty—to say what 
the law is—would be meaningless if the court stated the law differently 
at any given opportunity. While Alaska has adhered to the same method 
of summary judgment analysis since its earliest days,213 the notion that 
the summary judgment is “well-settled” is a dubious proposition.214 
A party raising a claim controlled by existing precedent must show 
compelling reasons for reconsidering the prior ruling.215 This burden 
includes two elements. First, the party must show that the prior decision 
was erroneous when decided or that intervening changes have rendered 
the decision currently unsound.216 A party seeking to challenge the 
summary judgment standard in Alaska would likely have a difficult 
time arguing that intervening changes in Alaska have rendered 
 
 210.  See Christensen v. Alaska Sales & Serv., Inc., 335 P.3d 514, 521 (Alaska 
2014) (“We see no reason to deviate from our long-established summary 
judgment standard today.”). 
 211.  Id. 
 212.  Id. at 520–21. 
 213.  See Gilbertson v. Fairbanks, 368 P.2d 214, 214–17 (Alaska 1962) (showing 
that shortly after gaining statehood, Alaska used the same summary judgment 
standard). 
 214.  See Christensen, 335 P.3d at 520 (attempting to clarify that the court’s 
“inartful use of the term ‘reasonable jurors’ was not meant to suggest use of the 
federal summary judgment standard”). 
 215.  Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 102 P.3d 937, 943 (Alaska 
2004). 
 216.  Id. (quoting State, Commercial Fisheries Entry Comm’n v. Carlson, 65 
P.3d 851, 859 (Alaska 2003)). 
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Christensen erroneous. Much has changed since the U.S. Supreme Court 
decided the Celotex trilogy in 1986, but little has changed since the 
Alaska supreme court decided Christensen in October 2014. Importantly, 
the parties in Christensen did not brief the issue of Alaska’s summary 
judgment standard.217 The appellee, seeking to affirm the lower court’s 
grant of summary judgment, simply (and wrongly) asserted that Alaska 
employed the reasonable jury standard.218 To satisfy the first element of 
the doctrine of stare decisis, the party challenging the current “not too 
incredible to be believed” standard would likely argue that the line of 
cases spanning from Moffat to Christensen have improperly evaluated the 
merits of the reasonable jury standard and arrived at an erroneous 
conclusion as a result. 
To satisfy the second element of the doctrine of stare decisis, a 
party must show “that more good than harm would result from a 
departure from precedent.”219 This analysis mirrors the costs and 
benefits discussed in this Note, and the court considered some of these 
arguments in Christensen.220 The harms of the reasonable jury summary 
judgment standard include: (1) restricting access to courts and trial; (2) 
uncertainty in applying a new standard in light of prior case law; and (3) 
risks of defendants imposing expensive discovery and motion practice 
on plaintiffs. However, these potential harms are outweighed by the 
benefits of the reasonable jury standard, including: (1) efficiency in the 
court system; (2) resolved confusion between the differing standards; (3) 
consistency in application; and (4) fairness to defendants. Ultimately, the 
reasonable jury summary judgment standard, applied in Alaska courts, 
is more faithful to the goal of the Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure: “to 
secure just, speedy and inexpensive determination of any action.”221 A 
modern summary judgment standard in Alaska would more effectively 
realize this admirable purpose. 
CONCLUSION 
Alaska should adopt the federal reasonable jury summary 
judgment standard. The benefits of a modernized method of summary 
 
 217.  Brief for Appellant at 24–25, Christensen v. Alaska Sales & Serv., Inc., 
335 P.3d 514 (Alaska 2014) (No. S-14963); Brief for Appellee at 11–12, Christensen, 
335 P.3d 514 (Alaska 2014) (No. S-14963). 
 218.  Brief for Appellee at 11–12, Christensen, 335 P.3d 514 (Alaska 2014) (No. 
S-14963). 
 219.  Thomas, 102 P.3d at 943. 
 220.  See Christensen, 335 P.3d at 520–21 (arguing that the more lenient 
standard preserves the jury’s role as the finder of fact). 
 221.  ALASKA R. CIV. P. 1. 
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judgment analysis are vast: judicial economy, consistency, fairness to 
defendants, and greater incentives for settlement. While the role of the 
jury as the finder of fact, stare decisis, and a long line of case law may 
stand in the way of a new summary judgment standard, the potential 
benefits of the modern federal standard outweigh these barriers. 
Additionally, certain aspect of Alaska’s procedural rules—specifically, 
notice pleading, the directed verdict standard, and “English Rule” fee 
shifting—would result in a more equitable application of the reasonable 
jury standard in Alaska as compared to the federal courts. 
Alaska’s current summary judgment practices fail to fulfill the 
purpose of the motion—”to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive 
determination of any action.”222 Summary judgment should not be 
denigrated as a trap for unsuspecting plaintiffs. “Its purpose is not to cut 
litigants off from their right of trial by jury if they really have evidence 
which they will offer on a trial, it is to carefully test out, in advance of 
trial by inquiring and determining whether such evidence exists.”223 The 
procedure’s goal mirrors that of the court system generally: to arrive at 
the truth. Alaska’s “not too incredible to be believed” summary 
judgment standard is less than adequate in fulfilling that role. The 
Alaska supreme court should reconsider Christensen and adopt the 
reasonable jury summary judgment standard. 
 
 222.  Id. 
 223.  Whitaker v. Coleman, 115 F.2d 305, 307 (5th Cir. 1940). 
